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Abstract: This paper examines the donor/partnership relationships of the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID/Zambia) and 
the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Zambia with local non-governmental 
organisations - the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) and the 
Southern Africa Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes 
(SACCORD) respectively on how the Western entities use public diplomacy 
and smart power as vehicles to alleviate electoral violence; the paper looks 
at what dialoguing efforts have been made by Zambian political parties and 
other actors in the period 2011 to 2016 to minimise political violence. The 
study was a case study of FODEP and SACCORD members. Primary data 
was gathered using semi-structured questionnaires; interviews with staff at 
the local NGOs and with USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia employees were 
done. Secondary research was also conducted; the data was analysed using 
triangulation method. The findings are that Zambia’s democratic credibility 
in Africa is regressing due to conflicting political parties inability to dialogue 
over differences; and that USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia, FODEP and 
SACCORD need to increase their efforts to eradicate electoral violence by 
sponsoring and carrying out more effective communications programs 
targeting poor, uneducated male-youths from shanty compounds.  
Keywords: Zambia, political dialogue, solutions, electoral violence, public 
diplomacy 
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Introduction 
 
When the head of the Zambian state, Edgar Chagwa Lungu, went on 
record admitting that it will be difficult to end political violence,1 many 
stakeholders agreed that there was a problem with political violence in the 
country – and that the efforts to eradicate it should be prioritised. Zambia is 
generally considered a peaceful nation, but this is changing particularly 
during the periods when by-elections and general elections are held — a 
phenomenon that has become more pronounced since 2011.  
This article examines the donor / partnership relationships of the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID/Zambia) and 
the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Zambia with local non-governmental 
organisations - the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) and the 
Southern Africa Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes 
(SACCORD) respectively - on how Western entities use public diplomacy 
and smart power as vehicles to alleviate electoral violence problems. In short, 
the utilization of USAID/Zambia’s and FES Zambia’s communication 
influence and financial strategies to curb electoral violence through 
sponsored programs was investigated. This paper also looks at what 
dialoguing efforts have been made by Zambian political parties and other 
actors in the period 2011 to 2016 to find solutions to minimise political 
violence. The area of research belongs to the history of public diplomacy and 
democratization processes. This field of study is interesting because amongst 
                                                          
1 Fridah Nkonde, “It won’t be easy to stop violence – Lungu”, The Post, 31st March 2016, 
available at http://www.postzambia.com/news.php?id=16939, accessed on 31st March 
2016 (accessed through Facebook). 
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other reasons it promotes peace-building through many avenues including 
states engaging communication strategies in foreign countries.  
 
Electoral violence 
 
Electoral violence actors are mostly impoverished, unemployed, and 
uneducated male youth cadres from shanty compounds in the Lusaka and 
Copperbelt provinces. They are transported from markets, streets and 
impoverished settlements to election areas in Zambia and paid paltry amounts 
of money to intimidate, harass, beat, injure, destroy private and public 
property and sometimes kill electorates. Political violence is not new in 
Zambia; however, with each president that the country elects into power, the 
frequency and the intensity of the level of violence increases. The five past 
presidents occasionally spoke against it but did not implement effective 
mechanisms to minimise or end it. The sixth president of Zambia, Edgar 
Chagwa Lungu, is also experiencing electoral violence in his tenure of office 
and has often spoken against it. Clearly, rhetoric is not enough, other 
stringent measures need to be put in place. Electoral violence nowadays is a 
controversy that is often associated with two political parties – the ruling 
Patriotic Front (PF) and the opposition United Party for National 
Development (UPND), with each blaming the other for its instigation.    
 Zambia is the second largest producer of copper in Africa but this fact 
has not rescued the nation from abject poverty. A World Bank report claims 
that Zambia’s economic growth has not translated into significant poverty 
reduction:  
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Sixty percent of the population lives below the poverty line and 42% are 
considered to be in extreme poverty. Moreover, the absolute number of poor 
has increased from about six million in 1991 to 7.9 million in 2010, primarily 
due to population growth.2 
 
 The poverty and social inequality that exists in Zambia provides an 
arena for opportunistic politicians to exploit poor youth into violent acts.3 
Think Africa Press writes: 
 
…the average “youth” member actually ranges between 20 and 35 years of 
age. They are believed to be recruited from Zambia’s large unemployment, 
urban, male population by the provincial chairmen of the parties, and paid 
around 25 Zambian Kwacha (approximately $5) for a day of activism. Cadres 
are usually provided with free beer and are sometimes armed with panga 
machetes. Some cadres are even known to switch parties from day-to-day, 
depending on who is hiring.4 
 
 Kapika reports that the instigators of violence, whom he identifies as 
Zambian politicians and party officials perceive violence:  
 
as both an offensive weapon and as a component of personal security – as a 
necessary part of any political campaign, and elections too are connected to 
how much money you have put into your ability to intimidate others. And some 
politicians argue that they must maintain some capacity to unleash violence 
                                                          
2 ***, “Zambia Overview”, The World Bank, 2016, available at 
http://worldbank.org/en/country/zambia/overview, accessed on 31 March 2016. 
3 Hope Nyambe, “A dissection of political violence in Zambia”, Zambian Eye, 3 October 
2013, available at http://www.zambianeye.com/a-dissection-of-political-violence-in-
zambia, accessed on 24 March 2016. 
4 ***, “Zambia – threat of political violence from youth groups”, Africa Sustainable 
Conservation News, 30 November 2012, available at 
https://africasustainableconservation.com/tag/zambia-political-violence, accessed on 25 
March 2016. 
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as a measure of self-defence. And too it is not possible to have a campaign 
without your boys. If you are around, they too must be around.5 
 
 Some members of the international community have made efforts to 
denounce the escalating levels of violence in Zambia. The European Union 
head of delegation, Alessandro Mariani, and the heads of mission of EU 
member states called in March 2016 on law enforcement agencies to bring 
perpetrators of violence to book. A joint statement communicated that:  
 
The EU delegation and heads of mission of EU member states are deeply 
concerned by the recent incidents of politically motivated violence in Zambia. 
(…) The absence of violence is required to guarantee the Zambian people their 
democratic rights to free, fair and peaceful elections. Moreover, preventing 
such incidences will strengthen Zambia’s international reputation as a 
peaceful, stable and tolerant country and its stance as a destination of choice 
for foreign investments and tourism.6   
 
 Within the African continent, the National Union of Metalworkers of 
South Africa (NUMSA) is a body that has been vocal in advising Zambians 
to desist from electoral violence and the Union has spoken out against human 
rights violations in Zambia.7 Many sectors of Zambian society, apart from 
advocacy NGOs, have reacted and strongly condemned electoral violence in 
the nation. These include traditional chiefs, the Law Association of Zambia 
                                                          
5 Brown Kapika, “Zambia: Zambia political violence and the hell of political cadres”, 
Lusakatimes.com, 17 March 2016, available at 
http://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/03/17/zambia-political-violence-hell-political-cadres, 
accessed on 16 September 2016. 
6 ***, “EU delegation in Zambia deeply concerned by incidents of political violence”, 
Lusakatimes.com, 16 March 2016, available at http://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/03/eu-
delegation-zambia-deeply-concerned, accessed on 18 March 2016. 
7 ***, “Numsa urges Zambian voters to ‘resist the slide into violence’”, Times Live, 10 
August 2016, available at https://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/2016/08/10/Numsa-Zambian-
voters-to, accessed on 20 March 2017. 
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(LAZ), women’s organizations, church bodies, renowned scholars and 
citizens.  
 FES Zambia’s role in the period 2011 to 2016 has been concerned 
with trade union capacity building; media and politics; producing state of the 
media reports; promoting the oversight role of the National Assembly; 
assisting in the understanding of constitutionalism and citizen participation; 
strengthening political parties; promoting the role of women in decision 
making and politics; promoting issue-based campaigns; as well as promoting 
conflict resolution and peaceful elections. The Foundation in Zambia 
momentarily generally concentrates on political governance.8 USAID 
Zambia’s functions deals with health, agriculture, climate change and 
improving environmental management, education, promoting civil society, 
governance, and human rights. Of these areas, health receives the largest 
chunk – 85 % of funding.9  
 
Hypothesis and Research Questions 
 
 The central hypothesis of this study argues that past and present 
Public Diplomacy (PD) and Smart Power (SP) strategies utilized by 
USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia in relation to their funding / patterning of 
democratic and good governance programs with local Zambian NGOs – 
FODEP and SACCORD – gave insufficient priority or none at all to 
                                                          
8 Helmut Elischer, Resident Director, Friedrich Erbert Stiftung Zambia. Email to author, 29 
August 2016, Personal communication. 
9 Janet Deutsch, Public Affairs Officer, United States Agency for International Development 
Zambia. Email to author, 20 October 2016, personal communication. 
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sponsoring non-violent activities, civic and voter programs; and that program 
funding priorities require re-strategizing and re-focusing on educating 
citizens on refraining from violent behaviour at election periods. It also 
argues that there is a growing need and urgency for specially tailored 
messages and programs that require formulation by NGOs for the purpose of 
targeting instigators and actors of electoral violence in Zambia.  
 The following research questions informed this study: 
1. What are the perceptions of FODEP and SACCORD staffers 
regarding USAID/Zambia and FES in Zambia?; What are the roles of 
USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia’s Public Diplomacy (PD) and 
Smart Power (SP) towards FODEP and SACCORD?; What is the 
relevancy of USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia for the finances and 
sustainability of FODEP and SACCORD?  
2. What impact, if any, do USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia have on the 
agenda of FODEP’s and SACCORD’s programs?  
3. What are the opinions of FODEP and SACCORD staffers on the ways 
to improve the effectiveness of programs combating political 
violence in Zambia?  
 
Significance of the study 
 
 This study will not only benefit USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia but 
also other numerous funders that will in the future join in the fight against 
electoral violence in Africa. The research will also benefit local NGOs that 
need to engage in or need to improve their efforts at combating electoral 
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violence; it will benefit scholars who would want to investigate other aspects 
such as the psychological well-being of harassed victims or the long-term 
effects. This observation is well articulated by Cyllah who argues that 
‘preventing electoral violence does not begin or end on Election Day; it 
requires a phased, continual engagement’.10  
 
Public Democracy and Smart Power 
 
 Melissen stresses that public diplomacy is part and parcel of world 
politics: 
 
(...) NGOs and other non-state actors seek to project their message in the 
pursuit of policy goals. Image creation and management is a key resource and 
one where non-state actors may have an advantage, helping to explain why 
the more traditional, hierarchical concept of strategic public diplomacy often 
fails to achieve its goals.11 
 
 This definition, registers clearly the importance of NGOs in the 
deployment of public diplomacy. The model of public diplomacy that is 
practiced between the interaction of USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia with 
local NGOs FODEP and SACCORD is the network model. This model 
encourages building networks by means of international dialogue; these can 
be in the form of partnering with other organizations to fund and host 
conferences, seminars, programs, and training activities for specific causes. 
                                                          
10 Almami Cyllah (ed.), Elections worth dying for? A selection of case studies from Africa: 
IFES case studies, Washington DC, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2014, 
pp. 2 - 3. 
11 Jan Melissen, The new public diplomacy: soft power in international relations, New York, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 41. 
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The network model also requires investing in communication research, which 
in turn enables well-strategized and tailor-made approaches which yield 
successful engagements with global partners.12  
 The concept of Smart Power was used in the study because local 
Zambian NGOs do not only operate on soft power influenced by funders / 
partners but also by financial assistance in the form of aid or grants (money). 
Smart Power (SP) involves the use of soft power and hard power in order to 
achieve effective results in varying interactions; soft power influences by 
means of ideas, policies, philosophies and ideals whereas hard power utilizes 
military or economic strategy to get things done. By eliciting and supporting 
NGO programs that champion democracy and promote human rights, 
USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia have set stage on what their preferences 
are. In short, the two entities fund programs and activities they deem 
important; local NGOs on the other side, have to get in line with these 
programs if they wish to coordinate with Western funders. Nye’s definition 
of soft power argues that soft power is ‘the ability to get what you want 
through attraction rather than coercion or payment’.13 Monetary clout gives 
hard power an upper hand as a means of strength and this is captured when 
Gallarotti argues that hard power relies on tangible power resources 
comprising of economic means or armed forces. Hard power therefore in this 
                                                          
12 Jamie Metzl, “Network diplomacy”, Carnegie Endowment International Peace, 1 April 
2001, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2001/04/01/network-diplomacy-pub-681, 
accessed on 9 June 2017. 
13 Joseph S. Nye, Soft power: The means to success in world politics, New York, Public 
Affairs, 2004, p. x. 
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study was defined according to Gallarotti’s argument14 particularly with 
emphasis on ‘economic means’. Armitage and Nye define smart power as 
neither hard nor soft, but as ‘(...) developing an integrated strategy, resource 
base, and tool kit to achieve American Objectives... It is an approach that 
underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in 
alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels’.15 
 Investing heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions indeed 
does not rule out financing Zambian NGOs to achieve a funder’s / partner’s 
agenda. USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia with their use of public diplomacy 
and smart power have indeed entered into alliances and partnerships with 
FODEP and SACCORD; these NGOs are a mechanism of delivering donor’s 
/ partner’s messages or principles of democracy and human rights values to 
the Zambian electorates through their civic and voter education programs. 
Nye (2008) writes that “Public Diplomacy is an important tool in the arsenal 
of smart power, but smart public diplomacy requires an understanding of the 
roles of credibility, self-criticism, and civil society in generating soft 
power”.16  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Giulio Gallarotti, “Soft power: What it is, its importance, and the conditions for its 
effective use” in: Journal of Political Power, vol. 4, no. 1, 2011, pp. 25 - 47. 
15 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye Jr., CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, 
more secure America, Washington DC, CSIS Press, 2007, p. 7. 
16 Joseph S. Nye, “Public diplomacy and soft power”, in: The ANNALS of the American 
Academy of Political Science and Social Science, vol. 616, no. 1, 2008, pp. 94 - 109. 
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Theoretical Framework 
 
 Three sources of theoretical framework were used in this study; these 
are the argument of “Dead Aid: Why Aid is not working and How There is 
Another Way for Africa” by Dambisa Moyo (2009);17 International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) – “Elections Worth Dying For? A 
selection of case studies from Africa”;18 and John Keane’s Theory of the 
Emerging Monitory Democracy (2009).19 Moyo writes that government-to-
government foreign aid has harmed Africa and should be discontinued as this 
is fuelling high poverty levels. She strongly disfavours systematic aid -  the 
kind normally administered through the World Bank (WB), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and other non-binding economic growth support 
which has not worked for Africa in over five decades.20  
 This study dealt with the aid that is received from USAID/Zambia 
and FES Zambia and directly made available through partnerships to FODEP 
and SACCORD – the type of aid Moyo does not, to greater extent, approve 
of. However, to call the funding the two local NGOs receive from 
USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia as charity-based aid is not the right 
terminology; this revenue is allocated with a more stringent partner-
orientated and results-based understanding. Moyo’s critical discussion on 
                                                          
17 Dambisa Moyo, Dead aid: Why aid makes things worse and how there is another way 
for Africa, London, Penguin Books, 2009, pp. 1-188. 
18 Almami Cyllah (ed.), op. cit., pp. 1-199.  
19 John Keane, The life and death of democracy, London, Simon & Schuster, 2009, pp. 1-
958. 
20 Dambisa Moyo, Dead aid: Why aid makes things worse and how there is another way for 
Africa, London, Penguin Books, 2009, p. 28. 
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systematic aid, however, proved relevant as many of her arguments could be 
applied to the type of funding channelled to the NGOs under study. This 
study argues that funding given by foreign donors is indeed crucial for 
Africa’s development, democracy, human rights and basic freedoms. With 
the escalating levels of violence witnessed in Zambia, it is necessary that 
some of the funding be diverted to upholding peace by means of strategically 
designed programs carried out through the auspices of NGOs. After all, 
international NGOs and organizations cannot operate freely and effectively 
promote their programs if a nation is ravaged by war. 
 The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) case 
studies availed rich source of information, particularly the work of Almami 
Cyllah and Elizabeth Côté who examined women and youth perpetrating and 
mitigating electoral violence in the West African countries Guinea and Sierra 
Leone. The IFES working in these two countries deemed electoral violence 
a major theme on their agendas and funded projects to get rid of it. In Guinea 
IFES collaborated with 50 civil society networks and organizations, working 
closely with youth and women.21 What was important to note from these 
experiences was how the IFES actively engaged youthful communities in 
mitigating electoral violence. It is interesting to note the similarities between 
Zambia and the two West African countries – all three have youthful 
populations, bountiful natural resources, and yet are hard hit with 
unemployment problems and high poverty levels. The youths are desperate 
                                                          
21 Elizabeth Côté, and Almami Cyllah, “Women, youth and electoral violence” in: Almami 
Cyllah (ed.), Elections worth dying for? A selection of case studies from Africa: IFES case 
studies, Washington DC, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2014, pp. 109 - 
122. 
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and are in crisis and, as a result, prove to be easy targets for elite politicians 
to manipulate into violent acts around electoral periods.  
 Keane published in 2009 a general global history of democracy. He 
writes that the history of democracy has had three distinct stages of evolution 
being the assembly democracy, the representative democracy and an 
emergent form which he has named ‘monitory democracy’.22 According to 
him, since 1945 the world has seen the vast introduction of power-
scrutinizing mechanisms; he refers to these as ‘monitory bodies’. Their 
purpose is to act as gate-keepers, both within a state and internationally, 
keeping power-holders in check outside the conventional mechanism of 
periodic elections and parliamentary representation.23 Zambia has still to 
consolidate its representative democracy. I sought to explore what Keane 
says about a combination of a still weak representative democracy and an 
emerging network of agents of the monitory democracy. Keane also writes 
that monitory democracy is not a straightforward matter to comprehend and 
therefore many misconceptions about it exist ‘beginning with the hostile 
charge that monitory democracy, since it fudges with the vital role of ‘the 
people’ is in fact no democracy at all’.24 
 Zambian politics is still stuck in the old ways of thinking and dealing 
with national politics in the rules of democratic representation. The nation is 
a republican democratic nation; democracy is understood as a system 
whereby citizens freely and fairly choose representatives by majority rule. 
                                                          
22 John Keane, The life and death of democracy, London, Simon & Schuster, 2009, pp. xv - 
xxiii. 
23 Ibidem, pp. 690 - 708. 
24 Ibidem, p. 689. 
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Keane argues that democracy is no longer simply a way of handling the 
power of elected governments by electoral and parliamentary means. He 
further states that democracy is larger than a nation and its reach operates 
way beyond territorial states. With the emergency of monitory democracy, a 
whole range of monitors have taken up the business of ensuring that all 
matters of human concern not just politics, are handled ethically and fairly.25 
Keane writes that “gone are the days when democracy could be described as 
‘government by the unrestricted will of the majority’.26 
 There is indeed a “blame game” going on between the two largest 
political parties in the nation as to who are the instigators and actors of 
violence. In December 2015, Zambia’s Republican President, Edgar Lungu, 
disclosed that he had received reports that the UPND party was planning to 
fuel violence in order to disrupt the 2016 general elections; he accused the 
opposition party of arming its cadres with machetes ahead of the election. 
President Lungu said he was running a democratic government that promoted 
dialogue but other citizens were abusing their rights.27 Hakainde Hichilema, 
the UPND president, called a press conference in August 2015 in which he 
denounced the use of violence in politics and boldly forbade the ruling party 
from engaging in what he termed ‘a culture of violence and intolerance’.28 
                                                          
25 John Keane, “Monitory democracy?”, ESRC Seminar Series Paper, Milton Keynes, Open 
University, 2008, pp. 8 - 14. 
26 Ibidem, p. 3. 
27 ***, “Zambia: UPND plot exposed”, Times of Zambia, 15 December 2015, available at 
http://www.allafrica.com/stories/201512160239.html, accessed on 17 December 2015. 
28 ***, “HH’s speech at UPND conference”, Open Zambia, 14 August 2015, available at 
http://www.openzambia.com/2015/08/hhs-speech-at-upnd-conference, accessed on 15 
March 2017. 
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 According to a Southern African Centre for the Constructive 
Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD) statement released in January 2016, the 
NGO’s Executive Director, Boniface Cheembe, lamented that: 
 
… The year 2015 witnessed a disturbing increase in the levels and intensity of 
political violence in the nation. The usage of guns became more pronounced as 
people were shot, injured and maimed as most stakeholders became concerned 
about the role of law enforcement agencies in preventing political violence... 
Furthermore, the year 2015 experienced some of the worst brutality witnessed by 
journalists, namely, the Post reporter and his Radio Feel colleague in the Eastern 
Province of Zambia. The humiliating reported violence of the journalists being 
beaten, urinated in the mouth, and almost burnt to death were disturbing and 
reminiscent of colonial style brutality.29 
 
 The electoral violence perpetuated during the 2016 general elections 
intensified, while election day was quite peaceful — the campaign period 
followed by the post-election period bore the highest record of violence-
related incidences. Various reports of people being physically beaten,30 
hacked with machetes or knifed, vehicles being attacked and stoned, women 
being stripped naked31 32, property being destroyed and burnt down and the 
defacing of campaign bill-boards picturing the PF and UPND presidents were 
captured in the media. A scholar admits “both PF and UPND cadres 
                                                          
29 ***, “2015 has been worst year for Zambia – SACCORD”, Allafrica.com, 1 January 2016, 
available at http://www.allafrica.com/stories/201601041826.html, accessed on 15 
September 2016. 
30 ***, “Sukwa recounts beating ordeal by PF cadres”, Facebook, 7 September 2016, 
available at https://www.facebook.com/postzambia/2084306701795167, accessed on 5 
August 2017. 
31 ***, “VIDEO: Woman stripped naked by PF cadres for wearing UPND attire”, Kitwe 
Times, 23 March 2016, available at http://www.kitwetimes.com/.../video-woman-stripped-
naked-by-pf-cadres-for-wearing-upnd-attire, accessed on 23 March 2016. 
32 ***, “Zambia: PF cadres strip woman naked in Mpulungu”, Allafrica.com, 6 January 2016, 
available at http://www.allafrica.com/stories/201601061212.html, accessed on 5 April 2017. 
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perpetrated some gruesome violence in the run up to the election”.33 In the 
same year, two youths were shot by the police, an incident which left a young 
woman dead and a young man hospitalised - this transpired when a UPND 
rally was abruptly cancelled by the police.34 Supporters of an aspiring UPND 
Member of Parliament (MP) allegedly physically injured an aspiring Forum 
for Democracy and Development (FDD) MP candidate in Namwala. These 
two incidences prompted the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) to 
suspend campaigns in Lusaka and Namwala for 10 days. 
 
Attempts at Discussions and Internal Solutions to Political Violence 
 
 Before determining whether Zambia can look to the outside world for 
assistance to resolve its political violence problems, it was interesting to 
investigate if the two major political parties in Zambia have tried to curb 
violence internally and what some of the suggestions that have been tabled 
by various stakeholders with regard to the same are. SACCORD suggested 
setting up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). This suggestion 
came after President Lungu made his presidential inauguration speech on 
September 13, 2016 at Heroes Stadium in Lusaka, and announced that he 
would institute a commission of inquiry into the cause of the post-election 
                                                          
33 Phillan Zamchiya, “Humble, mother-loving and God-fearing? How Edgar Lungu won 
Zambia’s presidential elections”, African Arguments, 16 August 2016, available at 
http://africanarguments.org/2016/08/16/humble-mother-loving-and-god-fearing-how-
edgar-lungu-won-zambias-presidential-elections/, accessed on 9 September 2016. 
34 ***, “Police shoot dead female UPND supporter in Lusaka”, Lusakatimes.com, 9 July 
2016, available at https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/07/09/police-shoot-dead-female-
upnd-supporter-lusaka/, accessed on 24 September 2016. 
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violence which occurred in Zambia. SACCORD argued that Zambia has in 
the past tried using a commission of inquiry such as the one that was used to 
resolve the Barotseland crisis; this, however, did not bring about trauma 
healing or reconciliation in the nation. A TRC approach was favoured 
because:  
 
... [it] will be victim centred and also take into consideration the needs of the 
perpetrators. It will help us understand the following questions: Who are the 
victims? Where are the victims? What is their state? Have they received any 
help? Why did the perpetrators do what they did to their fellow citizens? How 
did they feel when they injured their fellow citizen? Are they better off now 
after engaging in political violence?35 
 
 Despite this advice, President Lungu in October 2016 appointed a 
commission of inquiry in accordance with the country’s Inquiries Act. The 
commission’s mandate was to:  
 
...inquire into the voting patterns in the general elections conducted from 2006 
to 2016 and the electoral violence that characterised the 2016 general 
elections, in order to come up with recommendations that will prevent the 
occurrence of violence in future elections and ensure that voting outcomes are 
reflective of the people’s free will.36 
 
 Some members of the public condemned the commission as 
unworkable. Forum for Democracy and Development’s (FDD) spokesperson 
                                                          
35 ***, “SACCORD has taken keen note of the pronouncement by President Lungu”, 
Facebook, 14 September 2016, available at 
https://www.facebook.com/saccord.zm/posts/982568068518232, accessed on 14 September 
2016. 
36 ***, “President Lungu appoints a Commission of Inquiry to examine the causes of the 
political violence”, Lusakatimes.com, 22 October 2016, available at 
https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/10/22/president-lungu-appoints-commission-inquiry-
examine-causes-political-violence, accessed on 3 January 2017. 
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Antonio Mwanza was reported as saying there is no need for the government 
to be wasting taxpayers’ money when everyone knew the causes of political 
violence. Mwanza wondered why political parties had not been included in 
the process. He referred to the commission as a mere academic exercise.37 
 Another means of curbing violence in Zambia is having political 
leaders constantly encouraging their own members to refrain from violent 
behaviour; yet another solution that can also contribute to ending political 
violence in Zambia rests on the country’s political parties sitting down to iron 
out their differences through political party talks—there is need for tolerance 
and dialogue. The former Minister of Home Affairs Davis Mwila gave 
valuable advice when he stressed that the creation of peace and unity must 
start with political parties—then only can others emulate that and, in so 
doing, build Zambia’s image as a peace haven.38  Both the Republican 
President Edgar Lungu and Hichilema, the opposition president for UPND 
have attempted to call on the other to engage in dialogue on the subject of 
electoral violence. Such attempts were snubbed by one of them (or their party 
members), citing one reason or another. In one incident, President Lungu 
requested a church-mediated meeting with UPND, but Guy Scott, who was 
Zambia’s vice-president under PF rule and, at this time, had decided to 
support the candidacy of opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema, was quoted 
                                                          
37 ***, “Commission of Inquiry is a waste of time and resources; causes are well known – 
FDD”, Lusakatimes.com, 22 October 2016, available at 
https://lusakatimes.com/2016/10/22/commission-of-inquiry-is-a-waste-of-time-and-
resources-fdd, accessed on 3 January 2017. 
38 Kelvin Chongo and Doris Kasote, “Political parties to blame for violence”, Zambia Daily 
Mail, 9 March 2016, available at https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/?p=61785, accessed on 25 
March 2016. 
RJHIS 4 (2) 2017  
 
 
 
 
25 
 
responding to President Lungu: “This is not something that needs a 
workshop. It is a matter of enforcing the rule of law”.39  
 An interparty indaba (meeting) on violence was held at the Anglican 
Cathedral of the Holy Cross in Lusaka on March 29, 2016, at which 18 
political parties committed to end the vice using various strategies.40 The 
attendees included party presidents who unanimously agreed to utilize 
political leadership structures to fight violence from within their own parties 
and also to resolve issues amongst fellow political parties. Some important 
issues discussed were the discouragement of wearing military regalia and the 
use of machetes by political party supporters, a move that would eliminate 
fear and intimidation in society. However, despite the successful 
deliberations, reports of political violence did not abate. Seven months later 
in October 2016, Forum for Democracy and Development’s (FDD) 
spokesperson Antonio Mwanza remarked on the failure of the Cathedral of 
the Holy Cross meeting to live up to its agreed resolutions to curb electoral 
violence:  
 
...We as leaders of political parties, President Lungu himself, President 
Nawakwi, President Hichilema, Presidents of all other political parties spent 
the whole day with leaders of the church, reverends, bishops of the Cathedral 
of Holy Cross discussing causes of political violence and what we ought to do 
to end violence. We came up with resolutions. What happened to those 
resolutions? Nada! They were thrown in the bin.41 
                                                          
39 ***, “Who’s to blame for violence?”, Zambian Weekly, 10 August 2016, available at 
http://www.zambia-weekly.com/article/who’s-to-blame-for-violence, accessed on 20 
September 2016. 
40 Fridah Nkonde, op. cit., accessed on 31 March 2016. 
41 ***, “Commission of Inquiry is a waste of time and resources; causes are well known – 
FDD”, Lusakatimes.com, 22 October 2016, available at 
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 Shortly after the 11th August 2016 general election day, post-election 
violence broke out in some UPND Southern Province stronghold areas; 
Patriotic Front Deputy spokesperson Frank Bwalya and Patriotic Front 
former Secretary General Davies Chama (now defence minister) held a press 
briefing at the PF secretariat headquarters in Lusaka on August 23, 2016 
during which they announced that “President Elect Edgar Lungu will not 
meet opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema for peace talks… that Mr 
Hichilema’s call for peace is not genuine and it’s only meant for window 
dressing”.42 Hichilema was told to stop the post-election violence in his 
strongholds first where UPND supporters were burning down property 
belonging to PF sympathizers.  
 The signing of a peace accord is certainly another way electoral 
violence can be kept in check; this was tried just before the August 2016 
general elections but proved to be a futile exercise. In July, the Electoral 
Commission of Zambia (ECZ) had organized a peace accord meeting and had 
presented a draft document called the ‘Pledge for Peace’. This gathering was 
meant to facilitate the possibility of presidential candidates making a firm 
commitment to end electoral violence; nine candidates participated. Only five 
of the participants signed it; three refused and one said he would sign later. 
They requested an addendum to provide for rights, sanctions, obligations and 
measures for the enforcement of the Accord; the addendum was promised to 
                                                          
https://lusakatimes.com/2016/10/22/commission-of-inquiry-is-a-waste-of-time-and-
resources-fdd, accessed on 3 January 2017. 
42 ***, “Lungu refuses to meet HH to talk peace, there shall be no government of national 
unity in Zambia”, Lusakatimes.com, 23 August 2016, available at 
https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/08/23/lungu-refuses-meet-hh-talk-peace-shall-no-
government-national-unity-zambia, accessed on 4 September 2016. 
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be circulated to all nine presidential candidates by the ECZ.43 It was later 
amended and made available to the political parties; despite this effort, 
political violence did not cease. 
 
Methods 
 
 This study used phenomenological research that is qualitative in 
nature. It utilized case study research design on USAID/Zambia, FES 
Zambia, FODEP and SACCORD. The target population comprised the 
members of FODEP and SACCORD; non-probability sampling was used. 
Primary data was gathered from local NGOs FODEP and SACCORD using 
semi-structured questionnaires and several follow-up interviews were carried 
out with some full-time employees at the NGOs. Data was also gathered from 
key employees of USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia by means of semi-
structures interviews. Further information was sought using secondary data 
sources. The data was analysed using the triangulation method of analysis 
which involves both quantitative and qualitative means in order to produce a 
more credible outcome.  Whilst the research was designed to be qualitative 
in nature, it adopted a descriptive approach. To analyse the data using 
quantitative analysis I utilised the Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS) software system in order to interpret the data further through 
statistical operations. 
                                                          
43 ***, “ECZ to amend Peace Accord after HH and others refused to sign it”, 
Lusakatimes.com, 16 July 2016, available at https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/07/16/ecz-
amend-peace-accord, accessed on 18 July 2016. 
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Findings and discussions 
 
 One of the main findings of this study is that local NGOs FODEP 
and SACCORD perceive that Germany and America uphold human rights 
and they try to promote democratic electoral practices in Zambia. FODEP 
respondents think this because their NGO has received funding from 
American entities which were given to promote democratic processes and 
human rights activities. SACCORD believe that Germany and America are 
indeed democratic because amongst other reasons, they have funded 
programs related to elections with the aim of peaceful and fair outcomes. 
Both local NGOs also believe that Germany and America uphold human 
rights because organizations belonging to them speak out when democracy 
is under threat in Zambia. 
 FODEP and SACCORD believe that it is not possible for them to 
effectively carry out general programs on democracy and human rights issues 
including those aimed at minimizing electoral violence without financial 
assistance from international funders, of which USAID/Zambia and FES 
Zambia are a part. It was established that USAID had invested approximately 
US$7.5 million United States dollars in political processes programming in 
Zambia from 2011-2016 but only one program was sponsored to target the 
reduction of violent political behaviour; this program was not carried out with 
FODEP, the NGO under study. USAID/Zambia funded the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) with US$5,225,000 United States dollars. This 
was used to conduct the Youth Ambassador’s Program as one of multiple 
components of the Zambia Elections and Political Processes (ZEPP) Activity 
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for period 2015-2016. Of course, USAID is a larger organization, while FES 
Zambia is smaller in comparison; so, the one has greater financial muscle, 
while the other is more flexible to timely accommodate programs affecting 
the Zambian nation. 
 FODEP never applied for funding from USAID/Zambia specially 
for the purpose of programs aimed at eradicating political violence at 
elections periods caused by poor, uneducated constituents (actors) or 
instigators (sponsors of violence) because they believed the NGO stood better 
chances at winning contracts already being advertised by USAID than if they 
submitted their own program proposals. USAID/Zambia does accept 
unsolicited proposals and applications but financing is given mainly through 
competitive contracts. USAID/Zambia however funded two programs on 
democratic processes with the local NGO and these cost a total of 
US$161,552 United States dollars. One of the programs was entitled 
“Undertaking domestic observation in Zambia’s 2015 presidential by-
elections” and the second program was dubbed “Building confidence in the 
voter registration and voting process through youth participation”. 
USAID/Zambia was not FODEP’s largest donor.  
 FES has in its coffers 100,000 Euros (US$117,400) dedicated to all 
its national projects in Zambia yearly. From 2011-2016, FES Zambia 
conducted 15 dialoguing programs on political violence eradication at a cost 
of around 45,000 Euros (US$52,830). The Foundation normally spends 3000 
Euros (US$3,544) on a single project. FES Zambia’s funding policy is that it 
does not normally transfer money to a partner when agreement to carry out a 
specific program has been reached; it instead agrees to bear a certain aspect 
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of the expenses that the activity will need. In the period 2011- 2016, FES 
Zambia partnered with SACCORD and coordinated on 12 discussion 
programs aimed at reducing / eradicating violent electoral political behaviour 
costing 36,000 Euros (US$42,530). The Foundation had also bought 
electronic office equipment and donated a vehicle to SACCORD, bringing 
the grand total to 54,000 Euros (US$63,703) in five years. FES is not 
SACCORD’s largest financial contributor. SACCORD is permitted to 
discuss with FES Zambia ideas of programs it would like to undertake but 
these must fall under the mandate of FES. One of FES Zambia’s duties is to 
coordinate with labour unions, however, the Foundation has not yet made the 
effort of targeting the eradication of political violence in Zambia by 
collaborating with the country’s various unions; it, however, dealt with 
political leaders and youths on the same.  
 Despite these efforts by the two Western entities to provide funding 
generally for the two local NGOs under study, both FODEP and SACCORD 
felt there was need for donors to fund more civic and educational 
programmes that address the violent behaviour during Zambia’s electoral 
periods. FES Zambia has indeed done more programmes aimed at addressing 
the escalating political violence problem in Zambia compared to 
USAID/Zambia, but it is worth noting that despite USAID/Zambia only 
having funded one such program in the study’s timeframe (2011 - 2016), the 
Agency provides much larger sums of money for sponsored programs.  
 The ‘donor-aid-syndrome’ that renders Zambian NGOs almost totally 
dependent on Western aid has made financial aid a relevancy in their 
relationship with international funders. This dependency is unhealthy and 
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placed FODEP and SACCORD at the mercy of donors and partners in so 
much that they are unable to formulate and implement programs that target 
electoral violence on their own, on a large scale. There is need for innovative 
planning to generate own funds. Research on behavioural change also needs 
to be carried out by both FODEP and SACCORD so that programs on 
peaceful conduct can be evaluated to gauge successes and failures.  
 Apart from leaders in higher political structures of political parties 
who actually instigate electoral violence, the youths who are the actors of 
political violence deserve increased deliberate attention when implementing 
programs / activities concerned with curbing election violence. Focus on 
youth programs should in the future target male youths living in shanty 
compounds and other peri-urban areas of Zambia where there is high social 
inequality and the standards of living are very low. Although FODEP claims 
that urban and rural youths form part of their target, little effort to provide 
programs concerning peaceful conduct at electoral periods was done in 2011 
to 2016. SACCORD, on the other hand, has carried out 12 national 
dialoguing programs in partnership with FES Zambia in the period 2011 – 
2016, which focused on democratization processes and also dealt with issues 
of youth and electoral violence. The Foundation and SACCORD identified 
youths as pawns manipulated by politicians in the game of power politics; 
their program outreach involved youths from political parties, churches and 
civil society.  
 FODEP and SACCORD have plenty of suggestions on how future 
collaborations between their NGOs and USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia can 
be tremendously improved in order for the local NGOs to effectively deliver 
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programs, and also the best way the Western organisations can assist the 
NGOs in financing issues. The biggest need was that of more funding, which 
appear to be the cry of local NGOs in third world nations. However, it is 
important that Western donors and partners allow more project proposals by 
FODEP and SACCORD to be submitted for consideration as projects to be 
undertaken. USAID’s bureaucratic nature was also mentioned as a snag in 
working with the Agency; the process of acquiring funding quite challenging 
and not straight forward. FES Zambia on the other hand was found more 
flexible but only works with its partners and its budgets is limited in-
comparison to USAID.  
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
 Political violence is alive and well in Zambia during electoral periods; 
it has been there for more than five decades. It has been passed on from one 
presidential era to another and its “weapon” of choice is mostly 
impoverished, unemployed and uneducated male youth from peri-urban areas 
known as compounds. These actors, hired by influential politicians, are 
becoming more daring and lethal, capable of inflicting pain on victims or 
causing death. As more citizens are faced with electoral intimidation, fear 
sets in. Most of the nation’s presidents have been vocal in denouncing the 
vice in one way or another; however, a firm hand is required by allowing the 
rule of law to take its course.  
 In present day Zambia, the Patriotic Front (PF) and the United Party 
for National Development (UPND) need to seriously find ways to curb 
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violence. Attempts at dialogue have so far indeed proved futile because 
Zambia’s political leaders have chosen to “close their doors” and find one 
excuse after another why they cannot convene and analyse together what 
fuels mostly pre-election and post-election violence and, when they do 
convene, resolutions are not converted into actions. Zambia can revert to its 
past-praised image of a non-violent nation if its head of state, who is also the 
commander-in-chief, adopts a zero tolerance to political violence for all 
countrymen and women.  More definitely has to be done in the quest of 
eradicating political violence in Zambia. Besides international organisations 
like USAID/Zambia and FES Zambia, it is up to Zambian citizens, NGOs 
and especially political parties and public institutions to act in order to punish 
instigators and perpetrators and to provide rewards for political actors who 
cooperate in establishing a violence-free political scene in Zambia. 
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